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Abstract—Ever-growing incorporation of connected vehicle 
(CV) technologies into intelligent traffic signal control systems 
brings about significant data security issues in the connected 
vehicular networks. This paper presents a novel decentralized 
and secure by design architecture for connected vehicle data 
security, which is based on the emerging blockchain paradigm. 
In a simulation study, we applied this architecture to defend the 
Intelligent Traffic Signal System (I-SIG), a USDOT approved 
CV pilot program, against congestion attacks. The results show 
the performance of the proposed architecture for the traffic 
signal control system. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Emerging adaptive traffic signal control systems 
incorporate real-time traffic data in their signal phase and 
timing (SPaT) mechanisms to improve the performance of 
intersections (e.g., safety and throughput). However, 
centralized traffic signal control systems and their datacenters 
can be attacked by receiving and processing malicious 
messages from connected vehicles in the traffic network. 
These malicious messages can include false information about 
vehicle IDs, locations, trajectories, etc. Systematic malicious 
attacks are a major challenge for traffic datacenters that need 
to validate a large amount of vehicular data for making 
decisions in real time. Without a trustable defending 
mechanism, malicious information could lead to serious 
consequences in a traffic network such as collisions [1] and 
congestions [2]. In this paper, we present a blockchain-based 
architecture to defend intelligent traffic signal control systems 
against information and data attacks by transforming the 
conventional connected vehicle network into a trustable and 
transparent decentralized network.  
As an emerging computer network technology, blockchain 
was first invented in a cryptocurrency system, Bitcoin [3]. In 
the past few years, blockchain-based system designs have 
come a long way, and they have been successful in various 
decentralized applications [4, 5]. The nature of traceability 
and transparency in blockchain has a suitable match with 
increasing demands for data security in the connected-vehicle 
networks. However, most blockchain-based applications 
depend largely on digital tokens for the system design. This 
limits blockchain technology to be implemented mostly in 
cryptocurrency related systems. In this paper, we extend 
blockchain technology from classic cryptocurrency systems 
into traffic signal control systems. Blockchain not only links 
vehicles and infrastructures together in a decentralized 
network but also it works as a distributed and immutable 
ledger to automatically record vehicular information with 
timestamps. Furthermore, this distributed ledger provides 
trustable input data directly for intelligent traffic signal control 
systems.  
A. Our Contributions 
We address the problem of data security in CV-based 
traffic signal control systems. These intelligent systems 
receive and process a certain number of arrival vehicle 
information as input table to generate optimal traffic signal 
plans at each intersection. Due to limited computational power 
in real-time processing and their centralized algorithms and 
datacenters, they are vulnerable if the input table contains 
spoofing vehicle information. To defend CV-based traffic 
signal control systems against malicious data attacks, we 
designed a blockchain-based decentralized architecture. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
exploring the blockchain paradigm in CV-based traffic signal 
control systems. Our proposed architecture introduces i) a 
customized blockchain network for connected vehicles; ii) 
and a consensus protocol design for validating source data. 
For the blockchain network, we choose Hyperledger Fabric 
[6] framework as the developing platform. Comparing with 
other blockchain frameworks, Hyperledger Fabric provides 
more flexibility for non-cryptocurrency system design.  
In this study, we developed a blockchain prototype 
network. In addition, we perform simulations that show our 
prototype network can maintain a trustable distributed ledger 
for recording arrival vehicle information. For the consensus 
protocol, we designed a new mechanism to avoid attacker 
sending spoofing source information to the blockchain 
network. We add Roadside Units (RSU) and witness vehicles 
together as references for other nodes in the network to 
validate every piece of vehicle information before recording 
permanently in the blockchain network.  
To show how our proposed architecture contributes to a 
realistic CV-based traffic signal control system, we applied 
our architecture to defend the vulnerable USDOT Intelligent 
Traffic Control System (I-SIG) [7]  in a case analysis. In our 
architecture design, we utilize the distributed ledger on 
blockchain networks as input for traffic signal controller, 
which will avoid spoofing attack to the original datacenter. 
B. Organization 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we present previous research in CV network attacking and 
recent progresses in blockchain applications. In Section III, 
we describe a full architecture design for the vehicular 
network transform, a blockchain framework preliminary, and 
we present our blockchain-based network, consensus protocol, 
and the workflow process. To further illustrate how our 
blockchain based architecture works to defend realistic 
intelligent traffic signal control systems, we choose Intelligent 
Signal Control System (I-SIG) [7] as a case analysis in Section 
IV. In Section V, we performed extensive experiments to test 
the robustness and performance of our developed CV 
blockchain network. In Section VI, we analyze the security of 
the proposed architecture against potential attacks. In Section 
VII, we conclude this study and present directions for future 
research.  
II. RELATED WORk 
A. Data Spoofing Attack in CV Networks 
Similar to many kinds of intelligent traffic signal control 
systems, I-SIG system [7] take arrival vehicle information as 
input table and generate optimal signal plans at intersection. 
In a recent work, Chen et al. [2] showed that the  I-SIG system 
is vulnerable in the signal control algorithm level. Due to 
limited computation power, the signal controller cannot 
handle data validation in the real-time processing 
requirement, usually 5-7 seconds. They conducted the V2I 
attacking strategy by spoofing one vehicle information in the 
arrival table which caused congestion. Previously, 
Amoozadeh et al. [1] presented that spoofing attack in a V2V-
based network can cause significant instability and even 
collisions. In another work, Dominic et al. [8] reported new 
attack surfaces and data flow in V2V-based network. Note 
that V2I attacks can affect all vehicles in the same network as 
I-SIG attacking scenario [2] whereas V2V attacks that can 
affect a certain group of vehicles. 
B. Blockchain Technology in Transportation 
In recent years, exploring the Blockchain paradigm in 
general transportation field has attracted a great deal of 
attention (e.g. [9-11]). Founded in August 2017, Blockchain 
in Transport Alliance (BiTA) has attracted more than 450 
members around the world and became the largest 
commercial blockchain alliance [12]. These members are 
primarily from freight, logistics, technology companies and 
also academic institutes. The mainstream for implementing 
blockchain technology in transportation industry are freight 
tracking and food supply chain management. For instance, 
IBM has been working with retail giant Walmart to develop 
an efficient blockchain-based tracking system for food supply 
chain [13]. The blockchain technology helps Walmart to 
reduce tracing product time from weeks to seconds. This gives 
the company the ability to not only track where the food came 
from quickly but also how it was processed and distributed 
safely and responsibly.  
Some studies have presented the possibility of 
implementing blockchain technology in forensic investigation. 
A recent study proposed a forensic investigation framework 
for IoT using blockchain, which is called FIF-IoT [14]. In 
addition, Guo et al. [15] proposed a blockchain-inspired 
“proof of event” mechanism for accident recording system in 
CAV network. Compared to these studies, our work focuses 
on blockchain-based system design in a new field that 
improves data security for CV-based traffic signal control 
systems. 
III. ACHITECTURE DESIGN 
A. Vehicular Network Transform 
In a conventional centralized CV network (Fig. 1), every 
traffic signal control system has to set up its own datacenter 
that runs all the codes and receives all the data. In addition, 
vehicles interacting with this control system must 
communicates with its centralized datacenter. Due to lower 
transparency and the single point of failure, a centralized 
architecture is not suited for creating trustable connected 
vehicle networks that have frequent real-time data 
transmissions. 
We propose a blockchain traffic data network (Fig. 2) in 
which decentralization brings vehicles closer. Instead of 
having a central server and a database, the blockchain is a 
network and a database all in one [16]. It creates a vehicle-to-
vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure network that share all the 
data. Any vehicle connected to the blockchain talks to all the 
other vehicles and infrastructures in the network. Thus, there 
are no more centralized server but only connected vehicles 
and infrastructures that reach into agreements on the network. 
 
 
Figure 1. Central Server Vehicle Network 
 
 
Figure 2. Blockchain-Based Vehicle Network 
B. Blockchain Framework Preliminary 
In our architecture design, we choose Hyperledger Fabric 
[6] as the developing platform. It is the common platform for 
various mainstream blockchain systems. Comparing with 
older frameworks like Bitcoin [3], both Hyperledger Fabric 
and Ethereum [17] can provide programmable portion which 
is called Smart Contract [18]. Smart Contract is where the 
business logic of a blockchain network runs. We choose 
Hyperledger Fabric [6] instead of Ethereum [17] because the 
former provides more flexibility and modularity for 
blockchain implementation among cross-industries [19]. Most 
popular frameworks like Ethereum [17] cannot avoid digital 
tokens in system design.  This restricts blockchain technology 
to serve well only in cryptocurrency related system. In 
addition, Hyperledger Fabric [6] has a cost-effective approach 
towards transactions since no mining process from a 
cryptocurrency design is needed anymore. On the contrary, 
both Bitcoin [3] and Ethereum [17] require nodes to mine 
transactions by longer processing time and significant 
consumption of computation hardware and electricity. 
In a connected vehicular network, we utilize blockchain 
technology as a distributed ledger that records every vehicle 
information including VIN, Location (GPS) and trajectory in 
ledger (Fig. 3). In addition, Blockchain technology 
automatically add timestamp for each record, which makes it 
traceable. For this purpose, we don’t involve digital tokens in 
architecture design level to avoid adding unnecessary 
components and overheads. On the other hand, the flexibility 
and modularity in Hyperledger Fabric have been proved well 
in freight tracking and food supply chain systems like the IBM 
and Walmart project [13]. These precedents give us an 
appropriate launchpad for leveraging blockchain technology 
into connected vehicular network. Instead of recording 
vehicular information in a vulnerable and centralized server, 
blockchain technology creates a transparent and trustful 
decentralized database providing reliable information to the 
traffic signal control systems. 
As Figure 4 [20] shows, Hyperledger Fabric [6] is a 
highly modularized framework for developing full-stack 
blockchain networks. We first describe a blockchain network 
in four programmable parts: Model File, Script File, Access 
Control and Query File. Model File is where we define all the 
objects in the network. All the response functions are written 
in Script File. Hyperledger Fabric also provides Access 
Control to restrict data access to certain roles in the network. 
As for Query File, it works similar with conventional 
database query definitions. Except for the Model File, the 
other three parts are pluggable according to the application 
requirements. Then, we package up these files into one 
Business Network Archive file and deploy it into a running 
blockchain network. This blockchain network can be 
accessed and tested in a front-end webpage. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distributed Ledger on Blockchain 
 
 
Figure 4. Hyperledger Fabric Infrastructure 
C. Developing the Blockchain Network 
We developed a blockchain network prototype based on 
Hyperledger Fabric framework. We identified each vehicle 
by its VIN number. Our blockchain network maintains a 
distributed ledger for sharing and recording of arrival vehicle 
information as input for the traffic signal control systems. As 
shown in Figure 3, we define arrival vehicle information in 
the Model File as follows: 
 
Define Arrival Vehicle Information  
 
1. Vehicle_Info {   
2.            Record_ID                        
3.            VIN   
4.            GPS{   
5.                      Longtitue   
6.                      Latitude   
7.             }               
8.            Trajectory{   
9.                      Speed    
10.                      Accelartion   
11.             }   
12.            Timestamp                         
13. }   
 
 
Figure 5. Blockchain Network Webpage UI 
 
In order to make the ledger immutable, we grant Access 
Control rule for all participants. Each participant (i.e. vehicle, 
RSU, and traffic signal controller) only have ADD or READ 
operation access for ledger records. Therefore, no one can 
modify data in the ledger. We use Hyperledger Composer 
Tool [21] to generate the deployable unit file (.bna) and 
deploy it on the blockchain network. Hyperledger Composer 
Tool [21] also provides a webpage interface for connecting 
and testing the blockchain network (Fig 5). Each participant 
has an ID registry for connecting to the blockchain network, 
and we assign the traffic signal controller as the 
administrator. Other users’ roles are either a vehicle or an 
RSU.  
D. Consensus Protocol Design 
By deploying blockchain technology into a connected 
vehicle network, we can guarantee data immutability and 
traceability in a decentralized ledger. For this purpose, we 
design a consensus protocol for the network to validate the 
source vehicle information. After validation, our blockchain 
network records vehicle information permanently. Classic 
blockchain protocol in cryptocurrency can validate new 
transactions by checking hash code of tokens and the previous 
transaction history [22]. This is trustable since all tokens were 
carefully defined and encrypted as source data within the 
system from beginning. However, we do not involve digital 
tokens concept into the proposed connected vehicular 
network. Consequently, the consensus protocol needs a 
creative design. 
 
 
Figure 6. Broadcasting Scenario 
Vehicles broadcast their information among the 
blockchain network. For consensus protocol design, we add 
Roadside Units (RSU) as nodes into our blockchain network. 
Then, we introduce witness vehicles and nearby RSU together 
as references for validating source information. In this 
scenario (Fig. 6), if a broadcasting vehicular information is 
matched with references from its nearby RSUs and witness 
vehicles, the source vehicular information is trustable and we 
let the blockchain network to record it. On the contrary, if the 
source vehicular information cannot match with the 
references, we treat this as a malicious vehicular information 
and will not let blockchain network to record it. At the same 
time, we can locate and add this vehicle as an attacker into a 
blacklist. The consensus algorithm is represented as the 
following pseudo-code: 
 
Consensus Algorithm 
 
1. s = source data;   
2. r = reference data; 
3.    
4. Function validation (s, r) {   
5.       l = distributed ledger;   
6.      b = blacklist for recording attacker;   
7.      if (b.find(s) == true ) {   
8.             reject;   
9.       } else {   
10.             if (s == r) {   
11.                  l.add(s);   
12.             } else {   
13.                  reject;   
14.                  b.add(s);    
15.             }   
16.       }   
17. }   
 
E. Workflow Process 
Combining the above-mentioned four parts, we reach at 
the full view of our blockchain-based architecture for 
connected vehicular networks. As shown in the flowchart 
(Fig. 7), blockchain technology makes vehicular information 
transparent and trustable by providing protocol and 
cryptography on a decentralized network. When a connected 
vehicle broadcasts its information, the other nodes in the same 
network first validate this information by comparing it with 
references from nearby RSUs and witness vehicles. If the 
source information is false, blockchain network will not 
record this piece of information for the traffic control 
processes and record the malicious attack and the attacker. If 
the source information is correct, blockchain network will 
record and share it on a decentralized ledger. Blockchain 
technology automatically calculates each vehicular 
information into a hash code. Since every node including 
connected vehicles and RSUs saves all the data in the network, 
a spoofing attack can be quickly found by a peer-to-peer 
check. All the nodes will reach into an agreement for checking 
data and this process can be finished in real-time, within 
milliseconds.  
 
 
Figure 7. Architecture Flowchart 
IV. CASE ANALYSIS 
To show how our decentralized architecture works in 
defending traffic signal control systems, we employ the I-SIG 
system [7] as a case analysis, which is an intelligent signal 
control system for connected vehicles. As one of USDOT 
approved CV Pilot Programs, this system has been deployed 
in New York City, Tampa and Wyoming since 2016 [7].  
The I-SIG system takes arrival vehicles’ BSM (Basic 
Safety Message) messages, which contain locations and 
trajectories, as an input table to calculate and generate signal 
plans at each intersection (Fig. 8).  
In a recent paper [2], Chen et al. showed that the I-SIG 
system can be easily attacked in order to create congestions 
(Fig. 9). In their work, they first showed that I-SIG [7] is not 
able to validate arrival vehicles’ data in real-time. They 
modified one vehicle’s location and trajectory data in the 
arrival table. As a result, this straight forward attacking 
strategy can account for a blocking effect that jams the whole 
intersection. 
 
 
Figure 8. Original I-SIG system 
 
 
Figure 9. Attacking I-SIG system 
 
 
Figure 10. I-SIG system with Blockchain Technology 
 
This kind of attacking strategies can work successfully in 
a traffic signal control system relying on centralized vehicular 
networks. Our defending strategy is to leverage our 
blockchain-based architecture to transform the original 
centralized vehicular network in a decentralized one (Fig. 10). 
Instead of receiving and saving all vehicular information in a 
vulnerable datacenter, we record and share the information in 
a transparent and trustable decentralized ledger with traceable 
timestamps on the blockchain network. We show that 
blockchain can keep data immutable due to its decentralized 
cryptographic mechanism. We also introduce consensus 
protocol that combines nearby RSUs and witness vehicles as 
s for the source vehicular information validation. In this way, 
the decentralized ledger provides clean data input for traffic 
signal control systems such as I-SIG [7]. If an attacker is 
trying to modify the record on the blockchain, the network can 
quickly locate and reject the attack.  
V. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Experimental Setup 
We conducted simulations to test the robustness and 
performance of our blockchain framework under spoofing 
attacks. We deployed the blockchain network on Hyperledger 
Composer [21], which will maintain a distributed ledger for 
recording and sharing arrival vehicle information that contains 
VIN, GPS, trajectory and timestamp. We simulated sending 
and recording arrival vehicle information process by 
initializing 20 records on the distributed ledger (Fig. 11). 
Based on our consensus protocol design, the initialized 
records on the distributed ledger are validated arrival vehicle 
information. We access the blockchain and conduct 
experiments on macOS High Sierra operating system with 2.9 
GHz Intel i5 processor with 60 Mbps bandwidth Wi-Fi 
connection as the default settings. We simulated the attacking 
strategy by trying to modify records on the ledger. We then 
checked the response of our blockchain framework against 
attacks and record its performance via Chrome DevTools. To 
provide more insights for hardware and internet requirements 
of our proposed architecture in real CV environment, we 
conducted a series of experiments with different participant 
numbers, network speed, and processor speed. 
 
 
Figure 11. Initializing Arrival Vehicle Information 
 
 
Figure 12. Response Against Modifying Record 
B. Response Against Attack 
Protected by blockchain technology, our prototype 
framework will reject vehicular spoofing attacks 100% of the 
time successfully in real-time. Once an arrival vehicle 
information is saved on the distributed ledger, it does not 
allow any participant to modify it. Our blockchain framework 
rejects and pops out a warning message for any attempt to 
modify the records (Fig. 12). We use Chrome DevTools to 
record the performance and found that the average response 
time is on average 39 ms on the default hardware and internet 
settings. Considering that intelligent traffic control systems 
such as I-SIG take 5 to 7 seconds for processing signal plans, 
our proposed architecture will easily meet requirements for 
real-time operation and protect vulnerable traffic control 
systems. 
C. Change in the  Participant Number and Network Speed 
In a blockchain network, every participant runs the same 
code and saves the same data in a distributed way. 
Theoretically, our framework performance cannot be affected 
by participant number or network speed when attack happens.  
To change the number of participants, we increase original 
arrival vehicle records in ledger from 20 to 40, 80, 160 and 
320 and conduct 8 attacks separately. The average response 
time against attacks keeps around 39 ms as shown in Fig. 13.  
 
 
Figure 13. Response Time When Changing Participant Number 
 
 
Figure 14. Response Time When Changing Network Speed 
 
To change the network speed, we changed network 
settings from default 60 Mbps bandwidth Wi-Fi to fast 3G and 
slow 3G. Similarly, the average response time against 8 
attacks is still around 39 ms (Fig. 14). In extreme condition, 
we set the attacker offline (i.e. it cannot access to the ledger 
even locally). However, the ledger will restore once network 
connects. Note that changing network speed will only affect 
performance of adding and sharing new data (arrival vehicle 
information in our case analysis) on the distributed ledger. 
D. Change in the Processor Speed  
Since each participant runs code on its own processor and 
their hardware specifications are different, we tested our 
proposed architecture on different settings. We conduct this 
experiment by throttling default CPU speed slower. In CPU 4 
times slower scenario, we get the average response time at 74 
ms. In another setting, we slowdown the CPU 6 times. 
Loading webpage like popping out warning message becomes 
slower, in seconds. However, the back-end response process 
keeps at around 118ms. Figure 15 shows the response results 
based on 8 attacks in default CPU, 4 times slowdown and 6 
times slowdown configurations. The results show that our 
framework will still work well in a CV environment with low-
tier processors. 
 
 
Figure 15. Response Time When Changing Processor Speed 
 
 
Figure 16. Default Computer Response Time Against Multiple Attacks 
 
E. Multiple Attacks at the Same time 
We conduct above experiments based on one signal attack 
scenario [2] in the I-SIG system [7]. In our last experiment, 
we test the response performance against multiple attacks at 
the same time. Based on the Part C results, our framework 
performance is not affected by other participants since the 
framework distributes codes and data on each participant’s 
hardware. Therefore, multiple attacks do not affect the 
response performance. To verify this conjecture, we deployed 
our framework on a Local Area Network (LAN) and add three 
more computers A, B and C into the network as potential 
attackers. Although these computers have different processors, 
we focus on observing response time on our default computer, 
which has a 2.9 GHz i5 processor. To find the relationship 
between response time and multiple attack numbers, we 
conducted this experiment in four rounds: (1) default 
computer is the only attacker; (2) default computer and 
computer A are attackers; (3) default computer, computer A 
and computer B are attackers; (4) All four computers are 
attackers. We repeat 3 times in each round and record 
response performance for the default computer in figure 16. 
The results show that when there are multiple attacks at the 
same time, the framework can reject the attacks and keep 
response time of 39 ms for the default computer.  
Our framework’s performance is not affected by the 
misreports of multiple participants. Our Blockchain-based 
framework can transform the conventional connected 
vehicular network into a decentralized one in which not only 
the data but also the codes are saved and executed on each 
participant’s hardware.  
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed 
blockchain-based decentralized architecture for the connected 
vehicular networks. 
A. Spoofing Source Vehicle Information 
In a connected vehicle network, it is possible for on-site 
attackers to broadcast spoofing source vehicle information, 
such as false locations or trajectories. In order to avoid this 
kind of attack, we first add RSUs as nodes in our blockchain 
network. We then combine nearby RSUs and witness vehicles 
as references for consensus protocol. By adding this 
consensus protocol into our architecture, all participants in the 
same network will achieve agreement on validating the source 
information process. If the source information is matched with 
reference information from RSUs and witness vehicles, the 
blockchain network approves and saves it permanently on the 
distributed ledger. If the attacker is broadcasting spoofing 
vehicle information such as false location or trajectory 
information, this information does not match with reference 
information from RSUs and the witness vehicles. Our 
architecture rejects this spoofing information and adds the 
attacker into a blacklist.  
B. Recorded Data Attack 
Blockchain technology keeps data immutable. It ensures 
data security by saving data in a distributed ledger, peer-to-
peer check and various types of pluggable cryptographic 
algorithms including hash digest [23] and Merkle tree [24]. As 
mentioned in Section III Part B, Hyperledger Fabric [6] also 
provides Access Control to restrict data access to certain users 
in the network. The Access Control is implemented in a way 
that the participants can only read or add new data in the 
distributed ledger, but they cannot make any modifications. 
When an attacker is trying to modify the ledger record, our 
blockchain framework rejects and pops out a warning 
message immediately.  
C. Multiple Attacks at the Same Time 
We extended I-SIG attacking strategy presented in [2] 
from single attack to multiple and simultaneous attacks. The 
proposed architecture rejects all the attacks and keeps 
response performance the same for each participant. This 
shows that blockchain technology can fully transform 
connected vehicle network into a decentralized architecture. 
There is no centralized server in the network and each 
participant runs the code on its own hardware.  
D. Majority Attack 
A majority attack or 51% attack is an extreme attacking 
scenario when there is a super node that tries to manipulate the 
blockchain network, which has more computational power 
than the rest of the nodes. This only exists theoretically in 
mining-based blockchain frameworks such as Bitcoin and 
Ethereum. In our proposed architecture, the blockchain 
network maintains a distributed ledger for recording arrival 
vehicle information. Our architecture is resilient to majority 
attack since we avoided redundant digital tokens, transactions 
and mining process by employing the flexible Hyperledger 
Fabric [6] framework.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we designed a blockchain-based and 
decentralized architecture for connected vehicular networks. 
Targeting a promising blockchain implementation in a new 
area, we refine the workflow process in our vehicular network 
representation. In addition, we developed a blockchain 
prototype network and consensus protocol. To show how our 
architecture works in a realistic traffic signal control system, 
we used I-SIG system [7], which is under USDOT approved 
CV Pilot Program, as a case analysis. By transforming the 
original centralized vehicular network into a decentralized 
one, we defend the original vulnerable I-SIG system [7] 
against malicious attacks. In addition, we conducted a series 
of simulations to analyze the response performance under 
different settings.  
This study serves as the first step for migrating blockchain 
technology from cryptocurrency systems into traffic signal 
control systems. Future research directions include: (1) novel 
consensus protocol designs for validating broadcasted source 
vehicular data when a systematic group attack happens on site, 
when both nearby RSUs and witness vehicles cooperate with 
the attacker to send spoofing reference; (2) other realistic 
intelligent traffic control systems based on connected vehicles; 
(3) flexible blockchain framework developments for cross-
industries implementations. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] M. Amoozadeh et al., "Security vulnerabilities of connected vehicle 
streams and their impact on cooperative driving," IEEE 
Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 126-132, 2015. 
[2] Q. A. Chen, Y. Yin, Y. Feng, Z. M. Mao, and H. X. Liu, "Exposing 
Congestion Attack on Emerging Connected Vehicle based Traffic 
Signal Control," Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium 
2018, 2018. 
[3] D. Tapscott and A. Tapscott, Blockchain revolution: how the 
technology behind bitcoin is changing money, business, and the world. 
Penguin, 2016. 
[4] V. Buterin, "A next-generation smart contract and decentralized 
application platform," white paper, 2014. 
[5] H. Guo, W. Li, M. Nejad and C.-C. Shen, "Access Control for 
Electronic-Health Records with Hybrid Blockchain-Edge 
Architecture," IEEE Blockchain 2019, 2019.  
[6] "Hyperledger Fabric," https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric. 
[7] "CV Pilot Deployment Program," 
https://www.its.dot.gov/pilots/cv_pilot_apps.htm. 
[8] D. Dominic et al., "Risk Assessment for Cooperative Automated 
Driving," presented at the Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on 
Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy, Vienna, Austria, 2016.  
[9] Y. Yuan and F.-Y. Wang, "Towards blockchain-based intelligent 
transportation systems," in 2016 IEEE 19th International Conference 
on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), 2016, pp. 2663-2668: 
IEEE. 
[10] T. Jiang, H. Fang, and H. Wang, "Blockchain-based Internet of 
vehicles: distributed network architecture and performance analysis," 
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2018. 
[11] V. Sharma, "An Energy-Efficient Transaction Model for the 
Blockchain-enabled Internet of Vehicles (IoV)," IEEE 
Communications Letters, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 246-249, 2019. 
[12] "BiTA: Blockchain in Transport Alliance," https://www.bita.studio/. 
[13] "IBM Food Trust," https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/solutions/food-
trust. 
[14] M. Hossain, Y. Karim, and R. Hasan, "FIF-IoT: A Forensic 
Investigation Framework for IoT Using a Public Digital Ledger," in 
2018 IEEE International Congress on Internet of Things (ICIOT), 
2018, pp. 33-40. 
[15] H. Guo, E. Meamari, and C.-C. Shen, "Blockchain-inspired Event 
Recording System for Autonomous Vehicles," in 2018 1st IEEE 
International Conference on Hot Information-Centric Networking 
(HotICN), 2018, pp. 218-222: IEEE. 
[16] E. Gaetani, L. Aniello, R. Baldoni, F. Lombardi, A. Margheri, and V. 
Sassone, "Blockchain-based database to ensure data integrity in cloud 
computing environments," 2017. 
[17] "Ethereum," https://www.ethereum.org/. 
[18] K. Christidis and M. Devetsikiotis, "Blockchains and smart contracts 
for the internet of things," Ieee Access, vol. 4, pp. 2292-2303, 2016. 
[19] M. Valenta and P. Sandner, "Comparison of Ethereum, Hyperledger 
Fabric and Corda," FSBC Working Paper2017. 
[20] "Welcome to Hyperledger Composer," 
https://hyperledger.github.io/composer/v0.19/introduction/introductio
n. 
[21] "Hyperledger Composer," 
https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/composer. 
[22] Y. Yuan and F. Wang, "Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies: Model, 
Techniques, and Applications," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics: Systems, vol. 48, no. 9, pp. 1421-1428, 2018. 
[23] J. A. Dev, "Bitcoin mining acceleration and performance 
quantification," in 2014 IEEE 27th Canadian Conference on Electrical 
and Computer Engineering (CCECE), 2014, pp. 1-6. 
[24] Q. Liu and K. Li, "Decentration Transaction Method Based on 
Blockchain Technology," in 2018 International Conference on 
Intelligent Transportation, Big Data & Smart City (ICITBS), 2018, pp. 
416-419. 
 
